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METAMOTIVATION 2 
Abstract 
 
 Research on self-regulation has primarily focused on how people exert control over their 
thoughts, emotions, and behavior. Less attention has been paid to the ways in which people 
manage their motivational states in the service of achieving valued goals. In the present paper, 
we explore an emerging line of research that focuses on people’s beliefs about their own 
motivation (i.e., their metamotivational knowledge), as well as the influence of these beliefs on 
their selection of regulatory strategies. In particular, we review evidence showing that people are 
often quite sensitive to the fact that distinct motivational states (e.g., eagerness vs. vigilance) are 
adaptive for different kinds of tasks. We also discuss how other metamotivational beliefs are 
inaccurate on average (e.g., beliefs about how rewards affect intrinsic motivation). Finally, we 
consider the implications of metamotivation research for the field of self-regulation and discuss 
future directions. 
Keywords: motivation, self-regulation, self-control, regulatory focus, metacognition, 
intrinsic motivation  
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New Directions in Self-Regulation: The Role of Metamotivational Beliefs 
These days, it is common to hear people—researchers, the media, perhaps one’s 
reflection in the mirror—bemoan how poorly individuals fare in challenging self-regulation 
situations. Furthermore, there is much evidence suggesting that failing to regulate goals 
effectively leads to significant negative consequences at both an individual and societal level. 
Self-regulation failures prevent people from achieving a variety of important life goals (e.g., 
physical, social, and financial well-being) and play a role in many of the leading causes of death 
in North America (Mokdad, Marks, Stroup, & Gerberding, 2004). Yet researchers have also 
learned a lot about how people—quite frequently—get it right. In particular, they have focused 
on how people effectively manage their goals by regulating their thoughts (Flavell, 1979), 
emotions (Tamir, 2016), and behaviors (Carver & Scheier, 1998). However, until recently, there 
has been relatively little research focusing on whether or how people attempt to regulate their 
own motivations. In part, this may stem from a sense that motivation itself is an elusive target, 
that it is not possible to direct what one wants. In contrast, we propose that people may indeed be 
able to regulate what they want and that the study of such motivation regulation is an essential 
aspect of understanding human triumphs and foibles.  
Specifically, we argue that a more complete understanding of when—and why—people 
succeed or fail at self-regulation involves the study of metamotivation, a developing frontier of 
motivation science research (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kim, Brady, & Wolters, 2018; D. 
MacGregor, 1960; K. E. MacGregor, Carnevale, Dusthimer, & Fujita, 2017; Miele & Scholer, 
2016, 2018; Mischel & Mischel, 1983; Murayama, 2014; Murayama, Kitagami, Tanaka, & Raw, 
2016; Nguyen, Carnevale, Scholer, Miele, & Fujita, 2018; Scholer & Miele, 2016; Thoman, 
Sansone, & Geerling, 2017; Wolters, 2003). Integrating insights from work in cognitive, 
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developmental, educational, and social psychology, we conceptualize metamotivation as the 
processes by which individuals monitor and control their motivational states in order to achieve 
their goals (Miele & Scholer, 2018; Scholer & Miele, 2016). The "motivation" element of 
metamotivation reflects the key idea that motivation is the target of regulation. The means by 
which people regulate their motivation may be cognitive or behavioral; importantly, however, 
the targets of this regulation are the quantity (i.e., more or less) and quality (i.e., type) of their 
motivation.   
We propose that the efficacy of these metamotivational processes—and the success of 
goal pursuit more generally—depends in part on what people know and believe about the nature 
of motivation (i.e., their metamotivational knowledge and beliefs). Emerging research suggests 
that there is important variability in the accuracy of these beliefs. On the one hand, people often 
utilize appropriate strategies to increase desired motivations (e.g., adopting a big-picture 
motivational focus when anticipating self-control conflicts) and are quite sensitive to the fact that 
qualitatively distinct motivational states may lead to optimal performance on different kinds of 
tasks (e.g., that eagerness versus vigilance motivation promotes performance when 
brainstorming). On the other hand, people seem to hold inaccurate illusions about other aspects 
of motivation regulation (e.g., not recognizing the situations in which extrinsic rewards tend to 
undermine intrinsic motivation).  
When people regulate motivation, what are they regulating? 
Regulating motivational quantity typically involves knowing what types of strategies can 
increase motivation (e.g., Schwinger & Otterpohl, 2017), whereas regulating motivational 
quality requires that people also understand that motivation not only differs in level, but also in 
type. Indeed, several prominent theories of motivation and cognition (e.g., self-determination 
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theory; regulatory focus theory; construal level theory) distinguish between qualitatively 
different motivational states (e.g., intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation; eager versus vigilant 
motivation; high-level versus low-level construal) that can be increased or decreased via distinct 
strategies and have differential consequences for goal pursuit and performance.  
Although certain motivational states (e.g., eager approach motivation) are frequently 
heralded as generally beneficial, motivational states typically involve context-specific trade-offs 
(e.g., Sansone, 2009; Scholer & Higgins, 2012; Scholer et al., 2014). In other words, 
motivational states are not universally effective; rather, the effectiveness of a motivational state 
often depends on the particular demands of a situation (see also Bonanno & Burton, 2013). For 
example, whereas eager motivational states (enthusiastically seeking opportunities for gain) tend 
to enhance performance in situations requiring divergent thinking (e.g., a creative brainstorming 
task), vigilant motivational states (carefully protecting against potential losses) are more likely to 
enhance performance in situations characterized by convergent thinking (e.g., logic problems; 
Beuk & Basadur, 2016; Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005).  
The existence of motivational trade-offs such as these has two important implications for 
metamotivation. First, it suggests that the effective regulation of motivation involves knowledge 
of how different motivational states positively or negatively affect the performance of specific 
tasks in particular contexts (task knowledge). Further, identifying the optimal motivational state 
for a given context is not enough; people must be able to draw on their understanding of what it 
is like to experience this state (self knowledge) in order determine whether they are currently 
experiencing it; and, if not, they must find ways to induce the state in themselves (strategy 
knowledge; Miele & Scholer, 2018; Wolters, 2003; see also Flavell, 1979; Pintrich, 2002). 
Second, it suggests that the effective regulation of motivation in the long-term involves 
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significant flexibility—putting this knowledge of upsides and downsides into action so that one’s 
motivational state optimally fits with the motivational affordances of different situations one 
encounters. In other words, a central metamotivational challenge is recognizing that the type and 
amount of motivation that best promotes goal outcomes in the present context may differ from 
the motivational state that was best suited for the previous context (Miele & Scholer, 2018).  
Some aspects of one’s metamotivational knowledge may be tacit or implicit (e.g., Reber, 
1989; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). In such cases, metamotivational knowledge can be assessed 
by presenting participants with scenarios describing different motivational challenges and asking 
them to indicate which types of responses feel right or would lead to optimal performance (K. E. 
MacGregor et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018; Scholer & Miele, 2016). Participants with accurate 
knowledge tend to endorse the most appropriate response when presented with different 
scenarios, even if they are not aware that they possess this knowledge or cannot articulate it 
spontaneously.  
Metamotivational Beliefs: When People Get it Right versus Wrong 
 Across several distinct lines of research, evidence is emerging that people have both 
accurate and inaccurate beliefs about how to regulate their motivation. On the one hand, people 
are often remarkably sensitive to the qualitatively different motivational demands of different 
tasks. On the other hand, individuals also hold some inaccurate beliefs about how certain 
motivational states operate and how to best manage them. Examining these beliefs opens up new 
possibilities for intervening to improve self-regulation, a point we return to in the final section.  
Accurate Beliefs about Task-Motivation Fit. A significant body of work provides 
evidence that being in the right type of motivational state for the situation at hand leads to 
increased engagement and performance (e.g., Higgins, 2000; Motyka et al., 2014). While in 
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earlier work individuals were generally considered to be passive players in this process, the 
metamotivational approach highlights individuals as active agents that assess the motivational 
demands of the task at hand and regulate their motivational orientations in order to best negotiate 
these demands and maximize performance (Scholer & Miele, 2016). This research suggests that 
in many ways, people are quite sensitive to how qualitatively different motivational states fit 
different situations and tasks. For instance, participants in a series of studies by Scholer and 
Miele (2016) recognized that inducing vigilant motivational states (e.g., by recalling times they 
avoided getting into trouble or adopting an incentive structure that made losses salient) would 
lead them to perform better on tasks that required convergent (rather than divergent) processing 
(e.g., proofreading), whereas inducing eager motivational states (e.g., by recalling times they 
made progress towards life success or adopting an incentive structure that made gains salient) 
would lead them to perform better on tasks that required divergent processing (e.g., 
brainstorming).  
Related programs of research provide further illustrations of how individuals are sensitive 
to other aspects of task-motivation fit. For example, individuals hold accurate metamotivational 
knowledge about the qualitative aspects of motivation that facilitate success in self-control 
conflicts—conflicts between relatively immediate, local concerns versus distant, global goals 
(Fujita, 2011). Research on construal level theory has revealed that individuals are more likely to 
successfully resolve these kinds of conflicts when engaged in high-level relative to low level-
construal (i.e., when tuned to the abstract and essential rather than concrete idiosyncratic features 
of events; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). Overall, people do indeed correctly 
recognize that high-level versus low-level construal promote self-control (Fujita, Scholer, Miele, 
& Nguyen, 2018; K. E. MacGregor et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018). For instance, participants 
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indicate that tactics known to induce high-level vs. low-level construal (e.g., using abstract 
versus concrete language, focusing on “why” versus “how,” or generating categories versus 
exemplars) will enhance self-control. Importantly, individuals who have more accurate 
metamotivational knowledge about the role of construal in self-control evidence better outcomes 
for valued goals (e.g., reduced body mass index and higher grades; K.E. MacGregor et al.). This 
provides evidence that accurate metamotivational knowledge can lead to more effective self-
regulation. 
Individuals also appear to have some metamotivational sensitivity about situations in 
which intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation may be particularly beneficial for performance. 
Although intrinsic motivation can increase engagement and help to buffer individuals against 
setbacks (Burton, Lydon, D’Alessandro, & Koestner, 2006), it does not always predict high 
performance (Burton et al., 2006; Sansone, Smith, Thoman, & MacNamara, 2012). Intrinsic 
motivation may have few, if any, downsides when there is no time pressure or rigid performance 
appraisal criteria. However, under conditions in which enhancing interest is at odds with 
performance appraisal criteria, individuals who focus only on intrinsic motivation may not 
perform as well (Sansone, 2009; Sansone et al., 2012).  Edwards, Scholer, and Miele (2018) 
observed that individuals appear to recognize some of these dynamics—correctly identifying 
situations in which intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation would be most beneficial for 
performance, and identifying the types of strategies that could be used to increase intrinsic versus 
extrinsic motivation, respectively.  
Inaccurate Metamotivational Beliefs. While the research reviewed above suggests that 
individuals can be quite sensitive to the trade-offs of qualitatively distinct motivational states, 
emerging research reveals that people also hold some inaccurate beliefs about motivation 
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(Murayama et al., 2016; Murayama, Kuratomi, Johnsen, Kitagami, & Hatano, 2018; Scholer & 
Miele, 2016; Woolley & Fishbach, 2015). For instance, individuals appear to be overly 
pessimistic about their ability to sustain intrinsic motivation in the absence of extrinsic incentives 
(Murayama et al., 2018).  Further, individuals fail to recognize that intrinsic motivation can 
actually be undermined by extrinsic incentives (Murayama et al., 2016) and fail to appreciate the 
value of intrinsic incentives when anticipating future tasks (Woolley & Fishbach, 2015). They 
also fail to appreciate the benefits of setting self-concordant (i.e., autonomous) goals to satisfy 
their needs (Werner & Milyavskaya, in press). In addition, even when people are sensitive to 
task-motivation fit, they still strongly endorse the general utility of eager motivational states 
across most situations (at least in North America; Scholer & Miele, 2016). These kinds of beliefs 
may lead people to select and execute metamotivational control strategies that are ineffective or 
even counterproductive. 
Contributions to Existing Literature and Future Directions 
A primary contribution of the metamotivational approach is that it highlights how 
effective self-regulation involves not only the regulation of emotion, cognition, and behavior, but 
also motivation. Emerging research reveals that in attempting to regulate their motivations 
people hold both accurate and inaccurate beliefs. Investigating this metamotivational knowledge 
has significant implications for understanding how to help individuals be more successful in the 
pursuit of their goals.  
A second key advancement of the metamotivational approach is highlighting the role of 
knowledge as a source of self-regulation success versus failure. In contrast to research on self-
regulation that focuses on individual differences in capacity, the metamotivational approach 
focuses on understanding what people know about motivation as a pre-condition of effective 
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regulation. Incorrect beliefs about how rewards work or about what type of motivation fits a 
given situation not only increase the likelihood of self-regulation failure, but may also predict 
resistance to certain types of interventions. Key questions to explore in future research are how 
individuals develop metamotivational knowledge, how metamotivational knowledge in one 
domain (e.g., beliefs about eager motivation) relates to metamotivational knowledge in another 
(e.g., beliefs about intrinsic motivation), and how metamotivational knowledge relates to various 
socially-valued outcomes, such as physical health, academic achievement, and job performance.   
A third implication of the metamotivational approach is that it allows fine-grained 
predictions about the specific tasks on which a particular individual is likely to succeed or fail, 
rather than classifying individuals as generally good or bad at self-regulation more generally. For 
instance, some individuals may have accurate knowledge about how to most effectively utilize 
and sustain eager motivation. However, these same individuals may struggle to identify 
situations that would be better met with vigilance motivation or know what kinds of strategies 
could be used to increase vigilance. Thus, the overall success and well-being of these individuals 
may be largely dependent on the types of situations they encounter. In a world of eager tasks, 
they may soar; however, change the situations that these individuals encounter and suddenly 
their outcomes may look quite different. Thus, by taking context-specific beliefs as a starting 
point, researchers may be able to develop interventions that more carefully target the particular 
vulnerabilities individuals face.  
A related contribution of the metamotivational approach is the prominence it gives to the 
role of flexibility in self-regulatory success. As the prior example suggests, and as others have 
argued with respect to emotion regulation strategies (Bonanno & Burton, 2013), no motivational 
state or strategy is universally effective. Even if an individual possesses accurate knowledge 
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about a broad range of contexts, a key challenge in self-regulation is being able to flexibly 
implement this knowledge in real time. Moving forward, it will be important to identify what 
factors enable individuals to inhibit their motivational approach from a prior task in order to 
induce motivational states that are more appropriate for the current task. Perhaps some 
individuals (e.g., those higher in executive functioning) will be better able than others at 
deploying their motivational knowledge. It is also possible that some situations facilitate 
translation of knowledge more than others.  
In conclusion, although prior work in motivation science has done much to identify 
different types of motivational states and to document the antecedents and consequences of these 
states, less is known about people’s understanding of motivation and their strategic attempts to 
harness the optimal motivational state for a given situation. This is a critical question; what 
people know about motivation may determine how effectively they are able to manage it. Recent 
research in metamotivation highlight the importance of exploring the role of motivation 
regulation in understanding both when and why goal pursuit goes well and goes awry. 
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Recommended Readings 
MacGregor, K. E., Carnevale, J. J., Dusthimer, N. E., & Fujita, K. (2017). See reference list. 
- This paper presents several studies examining people’s metamotivational knowledge 
about the benefits of focusing on the big picture (forest over trees) when encountering 
self-control conflicts.  
 
Miele, D. B., & Scholer, A. A. (2018). See reference list. 
- This paper examines in more detail how individuals monitor their own motivational 
states and determine which strategies to employ. It also provides a review of a lot of 
prominent work in educational psychology.  
 
Murayama, K., Kitagami, S., Tanaka, A., & Raw, J. A. L. (2016). See reference list. 
- This paper presents a study examining people’s metamotivational beliefs about 
rewards—an example of how people sometimes get it wrong.  
 
Scholer, A. A., & Miele, D. B. (2016). See reference list. 
- This paper presents several studies examining people’s metamotivational knowledge 
about when eager versus vigilant motivation is optimal for performance, revealing 
ways in which people’s beliefs are both accurate and inaccurate.  
 
Wolters, C. A. (2003). See reference list. 
- This is a classic paper bringing attention to the importance of examining motivation 
regulation.  
 
